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The nut with a Huey Long outlook versus the
goblins of fear and distortion: Reubin Askew
and the Campaign to Establish the Florida
Corporate Profits Tax
By Gordon E. Harvey
t the dawning of the 1970s' the South stood on the verge of
a remarkable period of economic and political growth that
arned the region the nickname, "Sunbelt South." Whether
named for the constant dosage of sunshine the region received as
compared with the "snowbelt" of the Midwest and New England, or
for the optimism exuded by a region that had hopefully put the
tumultuous 1960s behind it, the South stood on the precipice of a
new, more progressive future. In the midst of a transformation
from their solidly segregationist past to that of a new optimistic,
hopeful South reminiscent of Henry Grady's efforts of the 1880s,
southern states attracted industry, investment, and commercial
development on an unprecedented scale. At the epicenter of this
growth stood Florida, a state that played no small part in the
region's overall attractiveness. A large and growing consumer pool
lured industry and business to Florida and made it the region's
fastest growing state. In his study of southern industrialization,
James Cobb described Florida's prime position: "The single greatest attraction the post-World War I1 South could offer market-sensitive industries was Florida's burgeoning consumer pool."1

A,

Gordon E. Harvey is Associate Professor and Head of the History Department at
the University of Louisiana at Monroe. He wishes to thank the anonymous referees of this article for their insight and suggestions for revision.
1. James C. Cobb, Industm'alization and Southern Societj, 1877-1984 (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1984), 57-66.

Published by STARS, 2007

1

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 86 [2007], No. 3, Art. 4

Indeed much of what attracted investors and businessmen to
the South after 1970 could be found in Florida. The state's population was more diverse than that found in other southern statesonly 37.6 percent of residents had been born in the state in
1970-and its culture was less identifiable as southern. Florida's
politics were also less reactionary and more business friendly than
its southern counterparts. Writes Cobb: "In short, although it
offered all the traditional cost advantages for residents and industries that were available elsewhere in the South, its respectable
political conservatism and relatively sophisticated population
made Florida seem almost non-southern." The state's ability to
quickly achieve "economic parity" with the rest of the nation
attracted tourists, residents, businesses, and investors. In-migration to Florida proceeded at record levels throughout the late
1960s and early 1970s, as almost 3,000 people moved to the state
each week. So optimistic was Florida's business outlook that many
people came to the state before they found work. And the people
who came to Florida brought with them a higher level of educational attainment than the native-born p o p u l a t i ~ n . ~
As Bruce Schulman has noted, the notion of a "Sunbelt" existed
long before the 1970s when the term gained notoriety. The U.S. military had designated the nation's southern states, a region that
extended through California, as the "Sunshine Belt." The rise of
what we now refer to as the "Sunbelt South" of the 1970s actually originated with Franklin Roosevelt and his declaration that the South was
the nation's number one economic program. The designation
began a tradition of federal investment and intervention in the
South, which contributed to its movement away from an Old South
mentality and toward industrial and political modernity. The southern pursuit of federal assistance, most often in the form of cold hard
cash, first by southern liberals, then by what Schulman describes as
"New Whigs'' reshaped the South and planted the seeds of industrial
and economic growth. Larry Sabato and Richard Scher have written
about the simultaneous transformation of the southern chief executives into capable, professional, and progressive governors, a remarkable conversion from the early twentieth century examples of
ineptitude that included Florida's Fred Cone and Louisiana's Jimmy
--

2.

Cobb, Industrialization and S o u t h m Society, 54; Gordon E. Harvey, A Question of
Justice: New South Governors and Education, 1968-1976 (Tuscaloosa: University
of Alabama Press, 2002), 171.
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Davis, who were variously described as "machine dupes," "political
pipsqueaks," or "flowery old courthouse politicians." Where and why
this change first began remains unclear, but several factors contributed to the transformation. First, the demise of one-party control
and the advent of more open and honest elections encouraged better prepared men, and later women, to run for statewide office.
Secondly, the competition for federal largesse and the need to "sell"
their states to industrial investors provided additional incentives to
change. By the mid-1970s, national political observers raved about
the nation's governors, particularly those from the South. David
Broder concluded in 1976 that there was probably no finer a collection of state governors than the fifty who held office in that year. The
governors who took office in the South took advantage of this new
found respect to reform their states to better meet the changing
nature of state economies and regional needs.3
Florida's Reubin Askew proved to be the archetype of the class
of governors about which Broder wrote. Born in Oklahoma and
raised in Pensacola, Askew was an improbable candidate for governor. His support came from the least populous region of the state;
the majority of Floridians lived in central and south Florida. Hailing
from the most conservative section of the state his candidacy would
likely produce skepticism among more liberal south Florida voters.
Nevertheless, Askew had an impressive record as a progressive legislator from the conservative panhandle section of the state. He had

3.

Whether this post-war transformation of the South is a product of class, race,
or some combination of the two is a matter of heated debate. The latest salvo
from the class side of the argument is Byron Shafer's and Richard Johnson's
excellent book, The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan
Change in the Postwar South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Bruce
J. Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic DmeIspment, and
the T r a n s f m t i o n . of the South, 1938-1980, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1991), ix; Old governor descriptions and Broder remarks cited in Larry Sabato,
"New South Governors and the Governorship," in James F. Lea, ed.,
Contemporaly Southern Politics (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1988), 194211; See also
Larry Sabato, Goodbye to Good-time Charlie: The Ama'can Governorship Transfmed
(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1983); David Colburn and Richard Scher rank
Cone as Florida's most passive governor who believed that legislating was the
business of the legislature and not the governor. Little happened in state government under his watch, David Colburn and Richard Scher, Florida's
Gubernatorial Politics in the Twentieth Century (Tallahassee: University Presses of
Florida, 1980), 279; An outstanding study of the 1970 elections that saw many
of the first generation of "New South" governors elected is Randy Sanders,
Mighty Peculiar Elections: The New South Gubernatorial Campaigns of 1970 and the
Changing Politics of Race (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002).
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risen rapidly through the state house and the senate, eventually
served as president pro tempore. In 1970, against the advice of most
of his closest friends and advisers, Askew campaigned for the governor's office and ran on a single major issue-tax justice. As one of a
group of young, progressive, "New Whig," gubernatorial candidates
around the South, Askew's populistic appeals resembled the demagogic tactics of Huey Long's "share the wealth" initiative.
Encouraging voters to take back control over the their state, he
accused his Democratic primary opponents of being squarely under
the control of corporations that did not have the people's best interests at heart. "Too long have the special interests controlled the
politicians in Tallahassee," declared Askew, "and too long have some
of the special interests gotten by without paying taxes on their prop
erty while the rest of us suffer." Askew lamented that Florida voters
had allowed politicians to "play their little games with us every time
we have an election, treating us like so many toys." He cited regular
increases of sales and consumption taxes as examples of levies that
were particularly oppressive for the poor.
Askew election was assisted by disarray within the Florida GOP.
Controversial incumbent Claude Kirk, a self proclaimed "tree shakin'
son of a bitch," had been challenged by drug store magnate Jack
Eckerd in the Republican Primary. Although Kirk won that battle, he
was wounded as he entered the general election thanks to
"internecine bloodletting" within the Republican Party between Kirk
and Congressman William Cramer and Jack Eckerd, whom Cramer
supported in the primary. In addition, Kirk's administration, while
contributing some solid reforms for Florida, especiallyin environmental policy, had limped into reelection in part because of his antics in
seizing personal control of the Manatee school district in 1970 in
order to prevent integration. Confrontation had become something
of a de facto policy of the Kirk administration, and voters had grown
weary of it. Askew also found common cause with Lawton Chiles, a
long-time legislator seeking a seat in the U.S. Senate. Like Askew,
Chiles was seen as an unlikely candidate for federal office. Walking
more than 1,000 miles across Florida, "walkin' Lawton" won his election easily. Together, Chiles and Askew gave face to a rising progressive impulse in Florida Democratic politics.4
4

Kirk quote in Time,20 April 1970; Undated Askew press release elaborating
on his "Fair Share" tax plan; n.d. ca. July 1970; Askew campaign speech,
Miami, August 8, 1970; Text of Askew campaign speech, Sarasota, 24 July
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Askew's Fair Share Tax Plan rested on the conclusion that the
traditional impulse to keep corporate taxes low to attract industry was
specious and misguided. Recent research had revealed that industry's main concern when relocating was not so much tax rates as it
was availability of skilled labor, access to markets and raw materials,
and the quality of the educational system. The St. Petenburg Times
met Askew's reform proposaIs with ebullience: "At last. A serious
candidate for governor has decided to do something about the way
government has been fleecing the typical Florida taxpayer." In an
August 8, 1970, speech in Miami, Askew reiterated his central, and
only, election theme of unfair taxes and spoke to the audience of a
rising crescendo for reform: "I don't care whether I am in Marianna
or Miami, people are calling for relief and they want it bad and they
want it now!" Since 1960, he explained, sales tax collections had
increased 284% in the state while "special interests" saw only a 3.5%
increase in their tax liability. If elected, Askew promised to rid the
state of "free- loader^."^ This topdown tax revolt resembled the tenor
of the California Tax revolt that occurred seven years later in 1978.
In that campaign, citizens pursued tax justice for themselves in the
face of increasing property tax assessments and rates, an effort that
resulted in an initiative to enact property tax reductiona6

5.

6.

1970, all in Reubin Askew Campaign Press Files, RG 900000 MSS, M83-8, Box
1; St. Petersburg Times, 7 August 1970; Edmund Kallina makes the excellent
point that one should not look at Kirk's 1970 defeat as the inevitability that
hindsight suggests. It is all too easy to examine Askew's record and career and
assume wrongly that his election was a foregone conclusion. For all his
shenanigans, Kirk was, in many other ways, an effective governor. To conclude that he was a "lame duck" waiting for defeat is to underestimate his ability and his record. To be sure, "Kirk fatigue" was a primary factor in his defeat,
writes Kallina in Claude Kirk and the Politics of Confrontation (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 1993), 184200; The "internecine bloodletting"
quote is from Kallina, 184.
Undated Askew press release elaborating on his "Fair Share" tax plan; n.d. ca.
July 1970; Text of Askew campaign speech, Miami, 8 August 1970; Text of
Askew campaign speech, Sarasota, 24 July 19'70, all in Reubin Askew
Campaign Press Files, RG 900000 MSS, M83-8, Box 1; St. Petersburg Times, 7
August 1970.
For more on the California tax revolt, see Robert 0 . Self, American Bahlon:
Race and the StruggEe for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2003), 282-290; Clarence Y.H. Lo, Small pro pert^ Versus Big Government:
Social Origins of the Property Tax Ratolt (Berkeley:University of California Press,
1990); Arthur O'Sullivan, Terri Sexton, and Steven Sheffrin, Property Taxes
and Tax Rpoolts: The Legacy of Proposition I? (Cambridge:Cambridge University
Press, 1995); and William A. Fischel, "Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?"
National TaxJournal 42 (December 1989): 465-473; Time, 8 May, 1978.
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Many of Florida's new residents were dismayed to realize upon
relocating that sales taxes far outpaced those assessed on corporations. Much like its southern neighbors, Florida exhibited a profound inequity between business and consumer taxes. Indeed,
Florida ranked among the national leaders in its tax inelasticity
and in the repressive effect of its collections. The state's historic
dependence on consumer taxes, its high small business taxes (Vh
highest in the nation), and high sales taxes (7th highest) contributed to the state's tenuous fiscal position. With the second lowest corporate taxes in the nation, Floridajoined Wyoming, Nevada,
and Washington as the only states that received "no significant
amount of money" from large corporations.' Many corporations
with a small physical presence in the state paid virtually nothing.
Essentially, Florida consumers who bought products from these
companies paid the taxes for other states, since the price of goods
in Florida was not reduced to reflect the tax differential. In 1969,
for example, General Motors paid $6 million each to California
and New York in corporate taxes. To Florida, General Motors paid
only $1,500 and Ford paid $400. National department stores
recorded similar tax payments;J.M. Fields paid a mere 20 dollars.
Several smaller department stores and car dealers in Florida paid
more in business taxes than Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors
combined. Shawnee, a small regional airline, paid more to Florida
than Pan Am. The average smoker paid Florida three times more
in cigarette sales taxes than R.J. Reynolds8
Askew left much to the imagination with regard to the free
loaders' identities, but was clear about their representatives-some
of whom happened to be his opponents in the 1970 campaign,
many of whom had labeled him a tax-hungry politician. Askew
hammered former Senate President John E. "Jack" Matthews for
the manner in which he "rammed" a legislative pay raise of $12,000
through the legislature in 1969. When Matthews refused to pledge
his support for removing the tax on groceries because it "is not in
my nature," Askew labeled him "Food Tax Jack," and asserted that
if the state wanted to return to "fiscal responsibility," its elected

'7.

8.

Ibid.
Gregory Johnson, "The Fair Share Plan: A Summary of the Corporate Tax
Proposal," 1 September, 1971, Governor Reubin O'D. Askew Papers, Florida
State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida, S686 Box 1 (hereafter cited as Askew
Papers).
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officials had to take tougher stands on fiscal matters. Not only had
Matthews shepherded the raise through the legislature, he also led
the fight to overturn Governor Claude Kirk's veto of that bill. In
Askew's view the reason for his actions was self-evident. 'Yes," he
wrote, "I can see why Jack Matthews is taking his stand, or rather,
lack of stand, on fiscal matters." Matthews was not the only recipient of such scorn. Earl Faircloth, Askew's Democratic primary
runoff opponent, received similar attention. "My opponent's views
when it comes to taxes," Askew accused, "reflect the same old philosophy that has badgered Florida's middle- and low-income families for years and is further evidence that if elected Faircloth will
continue to cater to those special interests that have succeeded in
escaping their fair share of the tax burden of the state for too
long." It was time, he asserted, for the "cloak of secrecy" that surrounded the corporate tax rate in Florida to be removed. Askew
did not wait until the general election to attack incumbent
Republican Claude Kirk. Kirk, he said, had enjoyed his four years
as governor: "He's enjoyed being governor more than any man I
know but the taxpayers simply can't afford him another four
years." Askew's campaign had been so aggressive in attacking special interests that some political observers warned that he was at
risk of becoming an "anti-business" candidate. Tax reform was
essential in making Florida a more attractive place for businesses,
Askew countered, adding that "no industry is going to be attracted
to a state which has an inadequate educational system, a high
crime rate, and a rapidly deteriorating environment." His overwhelming victories in both the primary election and the general
election were considered by many to be a mandate for the corporate profits tax.g
"We are committed to action. Talk alone will not be sufficient," declared Askew in his 19'71 inaugural address. Reflecting
on Florida's reputation as having one of the poorest tax structures
in the nation, he asserted, "We have stacked burdensome consumer taxes and property taxes on middle- and low-income fami9.

Askew campaign press release, n.d., ca. July 1970; Text of Askew campaign
speech, Sarasota, 24 July 1970; Text of Askew campaign speeches,
Tallahassee, 5 September 1970 and Tampa, 24 September 1970, all in. Askew
Campaign Press Files, RG 900000 MSS, M83-8, Box 1 in Reubin O'D. Askew
Campaign Papers, Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Florida (hereafter
cited as Askew Campaign Files); TallahasseeDemocrat, 8 August 1970,5January
1971; St. Petersburg Times, 3 March 2004.
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lies while granting special tax favors to the politically influential.
The time has come for this to end." It was time to be "honest with
ourselves," asserted the new governor, and "admit that this is going
to be one of those years in which the question would not be
whether there will be new state taxes-but, rather, who will have to
pay." For the legislature to even consider increasing sales taxes,
warned Askew, "woutd be a complete travesty of justice. It must
not be, it will not be, the answer of today." To that end, on the
same day he took the oath as governor, Askew sought a state
supreme court advisory opinion on the proper procedure to enact
the corporate profits tax, inquiring whether it could be done by
statute or by constitutional amendmen t.1°
Republicans demanded proof of a fiscal need for such a tax.
Boca Raton attorney Don Reed, leader of the 38 (of 119 total members) Republicans in the House of Representatives, a group he
called the "loyal opposition," said "I think that at this point the
position of the minority in the House would be in opposition to
any taxes until there is a much more thorough evaluation of ongoing programs." Reed suggested that Askew first check state spending by cutting wasteful expenditures before passing a new tax.
House Speaker Richard Pettigrew believed that Askew's speech was
"on the button" while Senate President Jerry Thomas remarked
that Askew's address was refreshing for its lack of timidity, a characteristic that had been the norm in recent Florida politics."
Askew was in office less than a month before he received the
first substantive report on the feasibility of a corporate income tax.
Assigned the task of studying the state's tax structure and making
recommendations, Askew assistant Gregory Johnson found that
Florida's was among the least elastic in the nation, and neither
kept up with economic growth nor met the state's need for new
revenue, the result of which "guarantees a fiscal crisis every four

10. Inaugural address of Reubin O'd. Askew, 5 January 1971, Askew Papers, S126
Box 20.
11. Tallahassee L)emocrat, 6 January 1971; Republicans were a distinct minority in
the legislature. The House only had 38 Republicans of 119 total members,
while the GOP lost strength in the Senate in 1970 losing two seats from 17 to
15 out of a chamber of 40, Tallahassee Democrat, 11 November 1970; For further discussion of party strength in the legislature see Aubrey Jewett, "Party
and Ideological Voting in the Florida Legislature," paper presented at the
2000 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association in Atlanta,
Georgia, copy in possession of author.
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years." Florida ranked fifth in tax structure inelasticity behind
Nebraska, Ohio, Texas, Maine, and New Jersey. With its heavy
reliance on consumer taxes, Florida ranked seventh in the nation
for tax regressiveness behind Washington, Rhode Island, Illinois,
New Hampshire, Maine, and Connecticut. Florida continued to
tax corporations at some of the lowest levels in the nation at a time
when other states had addressed the problem of inelasticity and
regressive tax structures. Since 1968 three of the seven most
regressive taxation states had implemented major reform.12
Johnson concluded that Askew's plan to tax corporations at a
rate of five percent on their profits would not prove a barrier to
business re-location to Florida since taxation was not as important
to businesses as other factors, such as availability of skilled labor,
raw materials, transportation facilities, and education. Johnson
also reported that North Carolina taxes on the textile industry
were higher than they had been when the industry was located in
New England. However the larger tax payment had not prevented
relocation of almost the entire industry to the South in the late
nine teen th and early men tieth centuries. l3
Over the next few months, Johnson's analysis honed the "The
Fair Share Plan," which became a priority, the priority, of the
young Askew administration. The plan rested on a single major
premise: large multistate corporations did not pay their share of
state taxes in ~ 1 o r i d a . l ~
To assuage the fears of small business owners and smaller corporations, the Askew administration asserted that they would not
be affected by the tax at all. Johnson estimated that 86,000 of the
110,000 corporations in Florida "will not pay a dime," since most
small corporations used their profits to meet payroll and pay dividends. Many Floridians feared a corporate tax, whether they
owned businesses or not, since they concluded that a corporate tax
likely would lead to a personal income tax. The state constitution
forbade a personal income tax unless enacted by a voter approved
constitutional amendment. In short, Floridians had total authori12. An inelastic tax structure, simply put, means that as total personal income
rises, tax revenues increase less than proportionately. "A Corporate Profits
Tax in Florida," Gregory Johnson report to Governor Askew, 25 January 1971,
Legislative Library, Florida Legislature.
13. Ibid.
14. Gregory Johnson, "The Fair Share Plan: A Summary of the Corporate Tax
Proposal," 1 September 1971, Askew Papers, S686 Box 1.
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ty to reject or approve a personal income tax, if indeed it ever
made it out of the legislature and onto a statewide ballot.
Nevertheless, convincing Floridians that taxes were not necessarily
evil incarnate proved a difficult task. l5
The Fair Share tax plan diverged from recent southern trends
in luring economic development and investment to the region. In
1950, writes historian Gavin Wright, the South had the highest
average regional corporate tax rate in the nation at 3.8 percent.
The rest of the nation taxed corporations at two percent. By 1970,
the South taxed corporations at only 5.5 percent compared to the
non-South average of 5.6 percent. In effect, Southern states kept
tax rates static as the non-South increased corporate taxation rates.
As Wright points out, in the years between 1950 and 1978 the
median corporate tax rate in the South declined from 85 percent
above to 13 percent below the national average. In Florida, consumers shouldered 88 percent of the state's tax burden, with the
state's corporate tax rate at least 13 percent below the regional
average.
Although Askew's tax plan contradicted southern trends, it
reflected an accurate assessment of several recent developments in
Florida. First, the state was missing out on much needed revenue
that could be obtained through a tax on corporations doing business in Florida. With an anticipated budget deficit of $250 million
for fiscal year 1971-72, the monies collected through corporate
taxes could be used to pay for the increasing social and public
services that accompanied the state's exploding population. In
1970, the legislature approved a spending bill that spent every
dime of revenue without setting aside money to pay for increases
in the education budget that it had approved in the same session.
This left Askew "behind the eight ball," in the words of his budget
adviser Kenneth Ireland. Second, the state had enjoyed a period
of tremendous industrial and commercial development during the
past twenty years with the arrival of companies such as Pratt and
Whitney, Martin Aircraft, Sperry Rand, Maxwell House Coffee,
IBM, and Anheuser Busch. The state's native industries-phosphates, cattle, frozen fruit concentrate-also boomed in the 1970s.
15. Ibid.
16. Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the
Civil Wur (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1996), 259-260; Ocala Star-Banner, 23
September 1971.
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And tourist attractions such as Sea World, Miami Seaquarium,
Busch Gardens, Cypress Gardens, Kennedy Space Center, Silver
Springs, and the world's largest paid attraction, Walt Disney
World, annually brought to Florida more tourists than the state's
population. Structuring a tax system that provided a fair return
from corporate profits would relieve the strain on state budgets
and finance the expansion of services.17
The obscure language of the state constitution provided a
major hurdle to the successful creation of new tax law. To be sure,
the state constitution stated that no tax "upon the income of residents or citizens of the state shall be levied by the state." But what
exactly was a "resident?" Could one interpret that word broadly
enough to include corporate "residents" of the state? Acting on
the governor's request for clarification, the Florida Supreme Court
ruled in early 19'71 that corporations could indeed be included
within the "resident" designation. Thus, to enact a corporate profits tax, Askew needed a constitutional amendment, an action that
required legislative approval for placement on the ballot, and
voter approval on the amendment itself. To place the question on
the next statewide ballot in November 1971 required a threefourths vote of the legislature. To place the measure on the
November 19'72 ballot required only three-fifths approval.l8
Following the Supreme Court's decision regarding the constitutionality of the tax, Askew turned to the legislature to adopt a
proposed amendment and to place it on the earliest ballot possible in order to use what momentum and political capital he had
remaining from the recent election and his inaugural address.
Although the Supreme Court's decision was taken by many as a setback for Askew, it was, to others, the "vehicle on which he can ride
his tax program to fiscal sufficiency." If voters were to reject the
amendment, by default they would have made the choice to allow
for increases in sales taxes to pay for the social services to which
many of them had grown accustomed. Askew wanted voters to
choose who would pay for their state services: corporations or
themselves. Convincing voters to approve the amendment was an
easier task than forcing it through a not-so-cooperative legislature.
17. Tallahassee Democrat, 3 January 1971; Miami Herald, 20 January 1971 ; Michael
Gannon, FZon'da: A Short Histmy (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
1993), 1361 39.
18. Miami Herald, 25 January 1971; St. Petersburg Times, 17 October 1971.
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In April he addressed the opening session of the legislature and
reiterated his position that tax reform was his "main purpose,"
warning the lawmakers that "this administration can not, and will
not, accept another penny increase in the sales tax to resolve our
present fiscal dilemma." House minority leader Reed said "I am
anticipating now that there is no way he can get ninety votes for an
emergency election" (in 1971), although he conceded that Askew
would easily gain the 72 votes needed for a 1972 election. Askew
relied on House speaker Richard Pettigrew, his good friend and
legislative ally, to build a successful coalition for an emergency
election in the coming November. The winning strategy for the
ballot initiative built on the political momentum from Askew's
recent gubernatorial campaign, the strength of the Democratic
Party in the legislature, and the governor's appeal among
Democrats. Moreover, some legislators likely assumed that even if
they personally did not favor the tax, there was little harm in letting voters decide, believing that they would surely vote against any
additional taxes, whether corporate or
Askew's aides differed on the question of whether or not he
should actively campaign for the tax now that he was governor.
Executive assistant Jim Smith urged him to take a positive and
aggressive role in the tax campaign. To step away from an issue on
which he had campaigned so fervently-to take a "let the people
decide" approach-might send mixed signals to voters and likely
lead to the tax's defeat. Smith argued that Askew had to take the
same aggressive approach that he did in the campaign. Moreover,
those who had supported him in the gubernatorial campaign had
to be visible once again and provide strong advocacy for the tax
plan. Powerful "friends at court," such as Representatives Marshall
Harris of Miami, Ralph Turlington of Gainesville, and Senator
Alan Trask, Chair of the Finance and Taxation Committee, lent
their endorsements and good names to the effort. However
Senate President Jerry Thomas did not join the tax advocates, at
least in the early phases of the campaign. Those who had helped
Askew win office, Smith confidently wrote, would again assist in the
19. Education Commissioner Floyd Christian remarked that Askew's address to
open the legislature was "the most constructive and forward-thinking address
that we have had." Floyd Christian to Askew, 6 April 1971, Askew papers,
S497, Box 1; Tallahassee Democrat, 22, 24 January 1971; Reubin Askew address
to opening session of the 1971 legislature, 6 April 1971, Askew Papers, S 65
Box 1.
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decisions affecting Askew's political future: "he will have no more
sincere or loyal help at the grass roots level for active support than
from those who put so much on the line for him last
The tax campaign began in earnest in September when Askew
announced the formation of "Citizens for Tax Reform," a public
advocacy group designed to campaign and coordinate the push for
tax reform in Florida. He appointed former state senator Ben Hill
Griffin to chair the group. One of the earliest advocates for a corpo
rate profits tax, Griffin had chaired the senate's committee on
Finance and Taxation in 1967. Joining G f i n on the committee
were Gwen Cherry, a state representative from Miami; Cecil Bailey,
President of Jacksonville's Gulf Life Holding Company; Marvin
Davies, President of the Florida NAACP; and Clarence Gay of
Citizen's National Bank in Orlando. In announcing the group,
Askew reiterated Florida's opportunity to implement a more just tax
structure and in doing so, create a more fair and equitable state. The
corporate profits tax, said Askew, "is our best hope for real consumer
and property tax relief, the cornerstone of meaningful tax reform,
and an essential part of a healthy state's revenue s t r u c t ~ r e . " ~ ~
It took little time for Citizens for Tax Reform to generate a
counterpart. Citizens Against the Florida Income Tax, Inc.
(CAFIT), a well-funded and secretive group, launched a threemonth campaign to kill Askew's corporate profits tax measure.
Although W I T refused to publish its membership roll, many
observers in Florida knew the major figures behind the organization-The duPont Estate, run by Ed Ball; Winn Dixie Grocery
stores, headed by J. E. Davis; and Associated Industries, the state's
business organization. CAFIT operated with a simple plan of
attack: create as much confusion as possible in an effort to convince Floridians that a vote for the corporate profits tax was a vote
for a personal income tax. For Askew, the task became a defensive
struggle against confusion and disinformation.**
20. Executive AssistantJim Smith Memo to Askew, 26 August 1971; Askew Papers,
S686, Box 1; TallahasseeDemocrat, 14 November 1970;Jim Smith (Askew executive assistant) notes from senior staff meeting, n.d. ca. April 1971, Askew
Papers, S 686, Box 1;Jerry Thomas voting record, internal memo for askew
1974 Gubernatorial Re-election Campaign, n.d., ca. October 1974, Askew
Papers, S497, Box 2.
21. Florida Times-Union, 3 September 1971; Askew Press Release, 8 September
1971, Askew Papers S686 Box 1.
22. Flyer for Citizens Against the Florida Income Tax, Inc., ca. September 1971,
Askew Papers, S686 Box 1.
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CAFIT purported to be the voice of the small businessman, an
assertion that produced exclamations of disbelief from many
Floridians. The Tampa Tribune found the claim curious, if not altogether untrue. The editors posited that CAFIT's definition of
"small" might not be exactly what most people thought. Van
Priest, the organization's spokesperson, owned fifteen convenience stores across the state. Perhaps owning 1 to 3 stores could be
considered small, wrote the editors, but certainly not fifteen.
Priest's fellow CAFIT members included such small businesses as
U.S. Steel, Gulf Oil, Sears, Southern Bell, Florida Power Company,
the Florida East Coast Railroad, Volkswagen, Firestone, Ford
Motor Corporation, ten banks, 25 insurance companies, seven
department store chains, two major trucking companies, and a
grocery store chain. It would not be prudent, warned the Tribune's
editors, for Florida voters to trust this group of "small" business
owners. The Ocala Star-Banner quoted an unnamed magazine that
described the members of CAFIT:
Its collective membership probably constitutes a compendium of the state's worst polluters of the air and water,
abusers of the consumer, overchargers of the public utility user, beneficiaries of tax loopholes, fighters against corporate taxes, and enemy of money for schools, prison
reform, welfare upgrading and the rest of the state's
endeavors.
For the average reader and voter, however, the constitution of the
organization was not apparent. None of these businesses appeared
on the organization's letterhead, an omission that left the impression CAFIT was a small-business revolt.23
Askew tied his tax proposal to education reform. One could
not occur without the other. In a March address before the
Florida Education Association Delegate Assembly (which had
recently endorsed his plan), Askew declared that "quality education and tax reform go hand in hand,'' and tasked the Assembly
with educating the public on the need for both. "We have overburdened those least able to afford additional taxes while continuing
to allow the politically influential to escape paying their fair share,"
23.

Tampa Tribune, 29 September 1971; Van Priest letter to unidentified
addressee (name redacted), 1 October 1971, Askew Papers S686, Box 1; Ocala
Star-Banner, 23 September 1971.
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explained the governor. "As a result, Florida today has one of the
most regressive tax structures in the United States." Sales taxes in
Florida, which had advanced to five percent, were not the
By September, an increase in voter registration numbers gave
state officials reason to be encouraged. Askew had predicted that
the tax issue would cause the rise of 'yoe Florida," and he seemed
to be supported by the voter registration increase. In St.
Petersburg, voter rolls swelled by an average of almost 160 new voters each day. North Dade County's state representative Sherman
Winn reported that 75 percent of his constituents favored the tax
amendment. So, too, did Joe Abrams, editor of a political affairs
newsletter, "The Florida Poll." The newsletter went to the mailboxes of legislators, state officials, and to "Joe Florida." 25
In the southern political equivalent of the biblical Daniel
marching in to the lion's den, Askew addressed the annual meeting of Associated Industries of Florida, an organization that paid
no taxes itself, claming a 1939 internal revenue code exemption
for business leagues. Invited to elaborate on his tax proposal,
Askew first tried to make light of the tension in the hall, confessing to stiffness because he was wearing armor plating for his protection. He explained he was there to speak of truth and fairness
as the best means to decide public policy, adding that "no one has
a monopoly on the truth." He admitted his own difficulty in
understanding how a majority of the members of the association
could "fail to recognize the lack of truth in what is being said about
this reform in the name of Associated Industries of Florida."
Pointing to the claims that the proposed tax was a tax on personal
income, he admonished the assembly, "Ladies and gentlemen, you
know as well as I do that that's a distortion and a disservice, and I
sincerely hope that you, the fair-minded members of Associated
Industries, will put a stop to it." He also expressed his hope that
approval of the tax on corporate profits would permit the repeal
the old Florida corporate net worth tax. But, he warned, it would
be a mistake to assume that the net worth tax would face repeal
24. Askew speech before the Florida Education Association delegate assembly, 6
March 1971, Askew papers, SG 126, Box 11.
25. "Report from your Florid State Representative Sherman S. Winn,"Vol. 1 No.
10, September 1971, in Askew Papers S686 Box 1; St. Petersburg Times,
September 30, 1971; "The Florida Poll," edited by Joe Abrams, 8 October
1971, in Askew Papers S 942 Box 4.
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regardless of the election's outcome. Should the tax reform package find defeat at the polls, Askew promised, he would act to
increase the net worth tax. The governor reminded his listeners
that the people who predicted his defeat were the same ones who
asserted that he would never win election on a platform of tax
reform. They were the same people who predicted that he would
fail to get a three-fifths vote in the legislature to place the measure
on the ballot. And they were the same people who said that he
would never get three-fourths of the legislature too authorize an
election as early as 1971. In short, Askew had more political
power, even on taxes, than they ever expected. In addition, he
assured his audience that regardless of the outcome of the election, sales taxes would not be increased. Such taxes, Askew
declared, were unfair to low-income Floridians and were not exactly fair to high-income residents. Florida would not remain, he
declared, a state with an overly regressive tax structure. "This cannot go on forever. It's not fair to the little man. It's not fair to the
consumer. It's not fair to the wage earner, the property owner, the
apartment dweller, or the small businessman. And it's not fair to
His plan, Askew explained, was aimed at large multi-state corporations rather than small-to medium-sized firms. Such multistate firms, he elaborated, followed a national pricing policy,
charging Floridians the same prices for products as they charged
New Yorkers, Georgians, or Ohioans. But since these corporations
paid no profit taxes in Florida, the state's consumers were, in
effect, paying taxes for other states. It was time, Askew declared,
for Florida to get its "fair share." Adopting a style that harkened
back to Henry Grady, he told the businessmen a story about his
beloved Joe Florida, whose everyday life involved more than a few
of these large firms:
It begins about 7:30 A.M, when Joe rolls over to shut off
the alarm on his General Electric clock. He bounces gingerly off his Sealy Posturepedic Mattress, and lands on his
Montgomery Ward rug. After brushing his teeth with
Colgate-Palmolive toothpaste, and combing his hair with

26. Askew speech before the Annual Meeting off the Associated Industries of
Florida, Miami, 31 September 1971, S126, Box 20, Askew Papers; Ocala StarBannm, 23 September 1971.
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an Ace comb and with the assistance of a dab of
Brylcreme, he shaves with his Gillette razor and his Rapid
Shave, and dries off with a Cannon towel. A whiff of Right
Guard deodorant and he's ready to slip into his Fruit of
the Loom underwear, his Sears and Roebuck shirt, and his
J.C. Penney suit. In the kitchen, Mrs. Joe Florida has heated up some water on her Tappan stove to make some
Maxwell House coffee to go with his Sunbeam bread, his
Kellogg's Rice Krispies, and his Sara Lee coffee cake. His
coffee was sweetened by Dixie Crystals, and his toast was
buttered by Bluebonnet. While eating, Joe watched the
Today show on his Zenith TV. Afterwards, he wiped his
hands on a Scott paper napkin, kissed the baby, who was
eating Gerber baby food and said goodbye.27
Of course, like his neighbors throughout Florida, Joe drove his
Ford or General Motors car to work. "I shudder to think how
much Joe already has contributed to other states in the way of corporate profits taxes even before he gets out the front door, which,
incidentally is furnished with a Yale lock," Askew intoned. "It's
almost embarrassing how we Floridians have been had over the
years." Joe Florida could not live without multi-state corporations
and their products. Florida could not live without a corporate
income tax. "The point is, gentlemen, that we're helping other
states solve their financial problems while we neglect our own.
This makes no sense at all," Askew added. A profits tax, he
claimed, was the perfect tax for businesses to pay in distressed
times: if a business showed no or little profit, then the tax liability
would reflect it.28
Askew used the occasion to address the concerns of a "new
group of 'small businessmen' who are campaigning against tax
reform." One member of this group was "that well-know small
businessman, Mr. Ed Ball." "Well, maybe Mr. Ball will qualify as a
'small businessman' someday," the governor predicted, "right after
the merger of Lockheed, General Motors and the Pentagon." But
he admitted that he was "perplexed as ever over the reluctance of
this group to let the public know who its members are," and asked,
"Why is this a secret organization?" If it was true that the organiza-

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
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tion planned to spend up to $250,000 the defeat the tax plan,
Askew demanded to know the identities of his enemies. It was time
for the state and its residents to look to the greater good instead of
personal gain, declared Askew:
Isn't it about time we gave some thought to the needs of
this state as well as the assets? Isn't it time we faced up to
our responsibilities by accepting that which is only fair and
just? And isn't it about time we stopped putting more and
more burdensome taxes on those who can least afford
them-while others go virtually scot-free. Let me share
something with you. The people of Florida are going to
win this battle for tax reform. This is one time they will
absolutely refuse to be turned against themselves. They
have come of age.. .the people of this state are tired of
being manipulated. They're tired of being used. They're
tired of being always the investor but never the vested.
They're tired of paying some of the highest consumer
taxes in the country. And they're tired of being asked to
go to yet another notch higher-year after year after year.
They're going to vote November 2, and they're going to
win. And I suggest that you join them, for your own good,
for the good of your organization, for the good of the business community and for the good of Florida.
Askew had a point, especially in regard to Ball, a man with
inordinate influence over state government. As early as 1935, Ball
had campaigned for a sales tax in Florida as a means of replacing
the state property tax, which affected duPont's Florida holdings.
He failed in 1935. However, in 1949 Florida adopted a sales tax,
a measure that had become necessary to counteract the disastrous
effect of the repeal of state property taxes six years earlier that Ball
had engineered.2g
The tax reform campaign was in essence an extension of the
gubernatorial campaign. Many of the same people who opposed
him in 1970 attacked his tax reform in 19'71. Askew went on the

29. Miami Nms, 1 October 1971;Askew speech before the Annual Meeting off the
Associated Industries of Florida, Miami, 31 September 1971, S126, Box 20,
Askew Papers; Tracy E. Danese, Claude Pepper and Ed Ball: Politics, Purpose and
Power (GainesviIle: University Press of Florida, 2000); St. Petersburg Times, 29
March 1987.
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defensive as opponents charged him with a secret plan to enact a
personal income tax in a campaign that was all too familiar. As
early as 1970, one of Askew's opponents in the Democratic primary, Earl Faircloth, had distorted his position in a series of television ads that claimed that Askew favored a personal income tax, a
position Faircloth opposed. Askew's surprising victories first in the
primary, then in the general elections, were seen by many as a
mandate for tax reform. His opposition in the tax referendum
took a page from Faircloth's political play book in using distortion
to oppose the constitutional amendment.30
Askew's efforts to convince the public of the need to support
the tax measure were not working as well as he expected. His academic approach to the issue, with explanations of tax rates and use
of statistics, proved counterproductive. He quickly abandoned the
strategy and adopted a tactic that appealed to his southern audience. Telling the story of "Joe Florida," he explained the effect of
tax reform in language everyone understood. The most successful
story, and one of Askew's favorites, involved a Sears dress shirt. He
stumped with two dress shirts, both from Sears, one bought in
Georgia, the other in Florida. The shirt bought in Georgia was
slightly cheaper because of a lower sales tax in that state-3 percent compared with 4 percent in Florida. Other than the slight difference in sales tax, the retail price of each shirt was the same. But
Askew reminded his listeners that Sears paid Georgia hundreds of
thousands of dollars a year in corporate profits taxes while it paid
Florida only $2,000. Should Florida consumers not expect a
cheaper shirt because of the low tax rate in their state, he asked?
Georgia, he told them, had a corporate profits tax, while Florida
only taxed capital stock up to a maximum of $2,100. Tax rates and
academic appeals aside, Askew's shirt stories touched a nerve with
Floridians and helped them come to the realization that, as Askew
told the hostile group at Associated Industries, they were tired of
being
Askew also took his stories to the airwaves as Citizens for Tax
Reform purchased advertisement time on local radio and televi30. Askew 1970 campaign press files, RG 900000, MSS, M83-8, Box 1; Tampa
Tribune, 24 September 1970; TallahasseeDemocrat, 5 January 1971.
31. Jan Godown, "A Talk With Reubin Askew," E U Research In Review 8
(Spring/Summer 1998); Askew speech before the Annual Meeting off the
Associated Industries of Florida, Miami, 31 September 1971, S126, Box 20,
Askew Papers.
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sion. With the populistic flair reminiscent of Askew's shirt tales,
one ad asked listeners: "Did you know that General Motors paid
only $1,500 to Florida in state taxes in 1969? They paid California
and New York $6 million each. Let's get our fair share." Another
asked smokers if they knew that R. J. Reynolds paid Florida only
$20 in corporate taxes in 1969? "But if you smoked one pack a day
you paid $55 in sales taxes. Isn't it time big corporations paid their
fair share?" The group posted one hundred billboards in the
Broward,
state's five most populous counties-Dade,
Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Duval. The boards implored readers
to "take some of the load off your shoulders" and support the tax.
"If you're tired of paying for your fair share and theirs too, vote for
the tax," urged another. Handbills put out by Citizens for Tax
reform took a less subtle approach. They identified corporate tax
opponents, such as the Florida Bankers' Association, which prior
to 1969, paid no sales taxes, intangibles taxes, capital stock or franchise taxes. One pro-tax handbill claimed that the Florida Jaycees
had voted to oppose the tax at the urging of its president, Randy
Avar, "only moments before he was given a free Buick Riviera by
General Motors C ~ r ~ o r a t i o n . " ~ ~
In conjunction with their populistic appeals Askew and
Citizens for Tax Reform played the part of an outmanned David to
the well-funded industry Goliath. Askew's group relied exclusively
on public donations and lagged far behind his opposition, which
was funded in large part by the deep pockets ofJames E. Davis and
Ed Ball. The son-in-law of Alfred duPont and the administrator of
duPont's estates in Florida, Ball was worth between ten and 100
million dollars personally. By 1966, duPont's holdings included
the Florida East Coast Railroad, St. Joseph Telephone and
Telegraph, Apalachicola Northern Railroad, St. Joe Paper
Company, and most important, the Florida National Bank
Group-thirty banks valued at $888 million. Passage of the corporate profits tax would affect all the duPont enterprises. As chairman of the Jacksonville-based Winn-Dixie Grocery Stores, Davis
also stood to lose money, but not exclusively from corporate tax

32. See radio ad scripts, billboard photographs, and flyers supporting the corporate profits tax, n.d. ca. September/October 1971, Askew Papers, S686, Box
1; Memo to Sam Ashdown, from "Pat," 23 September 1971, Askew Papers,
S686, Box 1; "Support the Tax" flyer, n.d. ca. October 1971, Askew Papers,
S686, Box 1.
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liability. The state paid retailers a commission for collecting sales
taxes. By 1971 this commission rate was as high as 3%,and WinnDixie received $285,000 for that year alone. Askew concluded that
the commission was inappropriate and too high, and planned to
repeal the commission while lowering the state sales tax, should
the corporate profits tax pass. The combination of a corporate
profits tax and the loss of sales tax commissions angered Davis.
Askew's campaign baited the two men to launch personal attacks
against the governor. As the election grew closer and as Askew
grew increasingly aggressive in his popular appeals, Ball and Davis
hurled insults at the governor. Ball called Askew a "damn liar"
while Davis labeled him a "nut with a Huey Long outlook."33
Although he had stayed clear of the battle until October, Jack
Eckerd, founder and owner of the Clearwater, Florida-based
Eckerd drug stores, sent out mass mailings to his Florida stockholders, warning that the tax would result in reduced dividends and
higher consumer prices. Davis also conducted a letter-writing campaign in which he also promised price increases and dividend
reductions. It was highly probable, he predicted, that dividends
might fall by 6 to 8 cents per share. Davis also expressed concern
for tourists. "We simply cannot afford to hang out the 'not wanted' sign for our wealthy winter visitors." The great lure for industry in the past had been the absence of a corporate tax, he wrote,
and that was about to disappear. Of course, for 'yoe Florida," Davis
saved his deepest concern. In each of the forty-four states that
adopted a corporate profits tax, Davis explained, a personal
income tax shortly followed.34
"Reubin Hood," as his opponents began to call him, traveled the
state to counter what he called a distortion campaign by his opponents. With little money to buy television or radio time, he campaigned in person, primarily in the large population centers,
including Dade and Hillsborough counties. On one occasion,
Askew faced protesters for an issue other than taxes-busing.
In
August of 1971, Askew had given a controversial commencement

33. In 1969, the duPont estate also owned 1,101,898 shares of General Motors
common stock, Fort Lauderdak Nezus, 3 November 1971; Raymond K. Mason
and Virginia Harrison, Confusion to the Enemy: A Biography of Edward Ball (New
York: Dodd, Mead and Co, 1976), 58-59,89,185.
34. Jack Eckerd to Florida stockholders, 22 October 1971; James E. Davis to
Norrell Miller, 20 October 1971, both in Askew Papers, S686, Box 1.
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address at the University of Florida in which he publicly supported
busing as the best means of achieving school integration. At the St.
Petersburg tax reform appearance, Askew was heckled by anti-busing protesters who shouted, "We want Kirk! We Want Kirk!" to which
Askew responded 'You sir, can have Kirk." Returning to his tax
remarks Askew stated that it was time for the state to stop paying the
corporate taxes of other states "but getting nothing in return for
ourselves." Askew also hammered Associated Industries: "Have you
ever remembered Associated Industries being concerned about the
prices of products they sell being too high? Where were they when
they were raising the cigarette tax and the sales tax and everything
else?" The issue transcended a mere debate over tax policy, he
explained. Florida was at a crossroads in its history. This vote, he
promised, would "reveal more clearly than ever before, whether we
are willing to master our own future, willing to face up to our own
problems and willing to do what is necessary to keep our state a
decent, clean, and progressive place in which to live." Askew was
confident that Joe Florida would stand up for himself: "This is the
one time the people will absolutely refuse to be turned against themselves by the goblins of fear and distortion.""
By mid-October, Askew knew he was winning, as he hinted at
a "privately guarded" internal poll that showed his proposal for the
profits tax was "clearly ahead." But the poll also contained disturbing news for Askew. Almost 40% of respondents were essentially
unaware of the election. To raise election awareness Askew
increased his daily speaking schedule to two speeches per day and
marched out other tax advocates to aid in the state speaking schedule-including James Pettigrew, Art England, Gregory Johnson,
Bob Graham, and Ralph Turlington (who engaged in a series of
debates with Jack Lee, the executive director of Associated
Industries). Askew was so concerned about election awareness and
maintaining support that he or his supporters spoke somewhere in
Florida at least every other day during the two months leading up
to the November vote. 36
Askew was not winning the contest for equal access to radio
and television airwaves, and he bristled at inequitable television
advertising in the campaign. With a much larger purse, Associated
35. St. Petersburg Times,23 September 1971; 9 October 1971; 17 October 1971.
36. St. Petersburg Times, 17 October 1971; Florida Corporate Profits Tax Speaker
Schedule, n.d. ca, September 1971, Askew Papers, S686, Box 1.
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Industries and CAFIT purchased air time on twenty-four stations
across the state. After consulting several law firms on the issue,
Askew became convinced that he was due equal time since this was,
in essence, a political campaign. He requested that every station
provide him with videotape copies and transcripts of each advertisement in order to facilitate a response. "I don't mind a good,
fair exchange over this issue, but I'm concerned about a lastminute attempt to confuse the people through a one-sided high
paying media campaign. I don't think any election should be
decided on the basis of who has the most money." Opposition
groups spent almost $120,000 on television advertising compared
with Askew's $1,400. To aid in fund raising, Fort Lauderdale attorney Alice Hastings, who had run for a U.S. Senate seat in 1970 and
lost, formed a "little people's movement" to collect small contributions. Askew's concerns were met with no small amount of disgust.
Van Priest, president of CAFIT, responded that Askew "has had
enough free stuff already. He's been using state employees, state
airplanes, and state vehicles to promote this thing." To reach
some point of clarity on the issue an Orlando station, WDBO, contacted the Federal Communications Commission for clarification.
Based on a similar 1963 case, the FCC ruled that "it is clear that the
public's paramount right to hear contrasting views on controversial issues of importance . . . cannot be nullified by the inability of
the licensee to obtain paid sponsorship of time for the broadcast
of a view contrary to one already presented in a sponsored program." In the end, three of the twenty-four stations (one each in
Tampa, Orlando, and Jacksonville) provided Askew with thirty-to
sixty-minute slots for the pro-tax position. Television advertising
was not Askew's only worry. He had received reports that some
banks and utility companies had mailed anti-tax letters with
account holders' monthly statements and bills. Askew unsuccessfully appealed to Public Service Commission chair Jess Yarbrough
to force utilities to mail pro-tax flyers along with anti-tax material.
Yarbrough did warn public utility companies not to pass the tax to
consumers if it was approved.37

37. The FCC ruling for Florida was based on an earlier ruling, Cullman
Broadcasting Co., Inc. 40 FCC 576 (1963). Florida Times Union, 21, 22
October 1971; Askew Press Release, 20 October 1971; FCC Report No. 10210
Broadcast Action, 20 October 1971, both in Askew Papers, S6868 Box 1 ; St.
Petersburg Times, 28 October 1971; Flon'da Times Union, 24 October 1971.
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The more Askew complained about unfair television air time,
the more his opponents attacked him for having the unfair advantage of state resources and employees. State Republican Chairman
Tommy Thomas of Panama City lambasted Askew for the recent
purchase of a state plane (although not specifically for the campaign) for $600,000. "I don't think the rank-and-file people will
vote for new taxes as long as the governor is throwing money
around like this," he observed. Worse yet, said Thomas, was
Askew's use of state funds and state employees in campaigning for
the tax. Such actions were by no means illegal or unethical since
Askew was not campaigning for his own political benefit, but
Thomas's accusations succeeded in briefly drawing attention away
from the merits of the tax proposal to an examination of Askew's
own spending habits and the spending behavior of state government. Thomas's accusations of "reckless spending" by Askew and
the state prodded House minority leader Don Reed, a powerful
Boca Raton attorney and Askew's strongest foe in the House, to
threaten an audit of the governor's spending during the campaign
to ensure that Askew had not abused his position. Travel, staff
time, use of state cars and airplane, and fuel purchases, he threatened, would all fall under his microscope. Askew had used his
office budget exclusively in conducting the campaign, so there was
little chance that Reed would find illegalities, but the threats of an
audit carried a stigma that Askew had to overcome. Reed also
requested that Askew allow him to use the state plane to travel and
oppose the tax as a symbol of the fairness and equity that Askew
had charnpi~ned.~'
Florida's largest and most influential newspapers allotted considerable column inches opining on the issue. In October, the St.
Petersburg Times devoted almost two entire pages of its newspaper
for a print debate between advocates and opponents. Arguing for
the tax was Gregory Johnson, whose expertise derived from his
role as author of much of the research and policy in Askew's office
and from his years in the state senate. His opponent was Jack Lee,
executive director of Associated Industries, who the Ocala Star38. Askew's expense reports from 1971 revealed that he claimed a total of
1,463.04 in personal travel expenses in his first eleven months in office, but
that through August, September, and October he claimed no personal
expenses even though it was his heaviest travel phase of the year-for the corporate profits tax, TallahasseeDemocrat,4 January 1972; Flon'da Times-Union, 22,
23 October 1971.
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Banner once described as having "the nerve of a hemp rope salesman making a pitch on death row." Johnson spent most of his
space arguing the details of the tax plan. The stories that Askew
told on the stump were emotionally effective, but Johnson had to
rebut charges that the corporate tax would be unfair to small firms
and would lead to a personal income tax. Tax reform was an
immediate necessity for three reasons, wrote Johnson: Florida's
inelastic tax structure meant that tax revenues did not grow in relation to growth in wealth, tax payers needed relief from the burden
of consumer taxes, and Florida was one of only three states that
raised no significant amount of revenue from large corporations.
Something was out of balance, asserted Johnson, if Ford Motor
Company and General Motors paid California and New York each
more than $6 million in 1969 but paid Florida only $1,500. Claims
that the tax would hurt small business were false. Ninety-three million of the estimated $100 million in annual revenue would come
from the largest five percent of companies operating in the state
and a mere 500 corporations would pay more than $65 million.
Few small businesses would feel the effect of the corporate profits
tax because all corporations were allowed to claim a $5,000 exemption. Since most small businesses and firms paid salaries and payroll from profits, the exemption most likely would prevent them
from paying any tax at all. To that end, almost 86,000 of the
110,000 corporations in Florida would pay no tax.39
Like the pro-tax advocate, the an ti-tax proponent offered little
that was new. Jack Lee argued that a corporate profits tax was a
dangerous first step to a personal income tax. Florida stockholders-a "cross-section of the workers in America7'-would suffer dividend reductions and higher consumer prices as such a tax would
inevitably be passed on to consumers. How could the governor
want such a tax, Lee asked, if tax revenues had increased by $100
million over the previous year? Plus, he continued, state officials
failed to consider the economic impact of newly opened Walt
Disney World theme park, which was expected to add 80,000jobs,
2'7,000 new hotel rooms, and 3'7,700 new houses with $750 million
in new construction. Above all, Lee concluded, the people of
Florida had to insist that their state government control spending
before implementing new taxes.'1°
39. St. Petersburg Times,17 October 1971; Ocala Star-Banner, 23 September 19'71.
40. Ibid.
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The Jacksonville-based Horida Times-Union strongly opposed the
tax, declaring that it was time for voters to "cry halt" to more taxes.
'Yet the cry from the top is not for a halt to government spending,"
the editors opined, "but for more money to finance unchecked government growth. Now the people were being asked to open another tax door, one that has been shut and bolted for decades.'' For
what theyjudged had become the "bitterest nonpolitical campaign in
recent history," the editors urged a "no" vote. In their second installment, the Times-Union revealed that in 1968 thensenator Askew had
led the opposition against a corporate income tax bill, which passed
the senate 29-16 only to fail in the House. If the tax was such a "moral
imperative," they wrote, why didn't Askew vote for it three years earlier. "This isn't tax reform," the editors complained. "It is simply
more taxes in tax reform's clothing." The final Times-Union editorial
on the tax, which appeared on page one, asked rhetorically,
"Another trip to the well?'' The state had enjoyed almost $272 million in revenue over the past year, all of which far exceeded expectations. Nevertheless state leaders claimed that the state was mired in
a "fiscal crisis." The crisis was in government spending, not revenue,
they asserted. Between 1961 and 1971, state general fund spending
had increased from $351 million to $1.246 billion, while total direct
revenue flowing into the state had increased from $793 million in
1960 to $2.43 billion in 1970. Where did all the money go?
Providing their own answer, the paper pointed to an expansion of
state government. Florida entered the 1960s with 38,000 state
employees,and closed the decade with 76,000-7,500 employees had
been added to the payroll in the fiscal year 1970-1971 alone. If state
government was unable of "living within the means" then it did not
deserve "another trip to the well." The Pensacola News-Journal struck a
less subtle note when its editors opined that Askew was trying to convince voters to "buy a pig in a poke."41
The Miami Nms, Miami Herald, and the St. Petersburg Times, r e p
resentative of a more politically liberal audience, endorsed the tax.
The News came out for the tax citing much of Askew's information
about its benefits and echoing his populistic appeals for its passage.

41. Ironically, it was the development of a full-time legislative staff system that
added so much to the budget. Hiring full-time staff, Askew later explained,
liberated the legislature from relying on interest groups and lobbyists for
issue-related data. Horidu Tzms-Union, 24, 26, 31 October 19'71; Pensucola
Nms-Journal, October 24, 1971.
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The Herald went further, condemning anti-tax groups for their
deceit and use of half-truths-comparing them to Adolph Hitler
and quoting Mein Kampf: "By clever, persistent, propaganda, even
heaven can be represented to a people as hell, and the most
wretched life as paradise." The "campaign of fear," as the editors
termed it, had to be exposed and defeated by Florida's voters to
"help Florida meet the twenty-first century on equal terms."42
The tax received endorsements from worker and student groups
also. The Suncoast Consumers League, Florida Association of School
Superintendents, Students for Tax Reform, National Association of
Social Workers, St. Petersburg Chamber of Commerce, Florida
Council of Senior Citizens, Florida League of Municipalities,
Seaboard Coastline Railroad Corporation, Florida Chiropractors
Society, Florida Farm Bureau Federation delegates, Hillsborough
County L e a p e of Women Voters, Duval County Citizens for Tax
Reform, and Central Florida Voters Council endorsed the tax plan.
Notable among these endorsements was that of St. Regis Paper
Company. The largest paper company in Florida and a state-resident
for twenty-six years, the company paid $3 million a year in local and
state taxes and another $750,000 in sales taxes and property taxes in
twenty-three counties. Nevertheless the company endorsed the plan
tax as the best way to "broaden the tax base and raise additional
money to fund state government." The Carpenters District Council
of Florida wrote to its members invoking class-based language: "the
fact that it [the tax] is being fought strenuously by all large businesses
should be a clue as to which way the working people should vote."43
Askew's extensive speaking campaign-136
engagements
between September '7 and November I-and mostly favorable press
coverage swelled Citizens for Tax Reform coffers. By November 1,
42. Miami Nms, 27 October 1971; Miami Herald, 17 October 1971; St. Petershrg
Times, 31 October 1971.
43. Ebrida Times Union (Farm Bureau Endorsement), 30 October 1971; Miami
Hernld, 2 November 1971; , See list of Corporate Profits Tax Support correspondence, n.d. ca. 1 November 1971, Askew Papers, S939 Box 1; Rick
Benton (Students for Tax Reform) to college newspaper editors, 22 October
1971, in Askew Papers S686, Box 1; C.T. Craven (President, Florida
Chiropractors Society) to Askew, 22 October 19'71; Tim Adams (Central
Florida Voters Council) to Askew, 27 April 1971; Frank Westbrook (District
Manager for Public relations St. Regis Paper company to Tampa Tribune
Editor J.A. Clerinden, 7 October 1971; Carpenters District Council to members, 20 October 1971, all in Askew Papers 939, Box 1; Invoice for 25,000 flyers to Citizens for Tax Reform from Duval County branch, Askew Papers
S686, Box 1.
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the group had collected $47,453 in donations, few of which were
larger than $250, and most ranged from $20 to $50 dollars. There
were quite a few one dollar donations to the effort, which gave some
credence to Askew's claim that Joe Florida wanted tax justice.
Donations had flooded into the group at a record pace in early
October, with a one-week total of almost $15,343. Through October
26 the group spent $20,298, reserving the balance for a final push in
the days leading up to the election. Askew generally eschewed fund
raising, likening it to begging [he would later abandon a U.S. Senate
campaign in 1988 because he detested fund raising] but had exhibited cautious optimism that if any issue would cause the average
voter to contribute money, it was tax reform. Despite his success in
collecting donations, Askew knew it would never match the opposition: "But we cannot hope-nor would we want-to match the quarter-of-a-million dollars which the special interests are reportedly
spending in an attempt to scare the people into voting against themselves in the November 2 election."44
Opposition voices emanated from all quarters of the state.
State Representative Jon Thomas, a Republican from Ft.
Lauderdale, denied any mandate for tax reform. State Senate
President Jerry Thomas, an Askew ally in the senate, reported that
he did not endorse the tax, but in a nod to his relationship to
Askew, announced that although he would not vote for the tax, he
would not actively campaign against it. His ambivalence dated to
an earlier period, when the measure was scheduled for consideration in the Senate. As senate president he had considerable power
that would have allowed him to kill the bill and prevent its continuance through the legislature, but he refused to do so. Thomas
and Askew has served together in the Senate, and his ambivalence
most likely emanated from their good relationship. Arthur
England of Miami, another Askew supporter, also announced his
opposition to the tax."
In one 72 hour period in the early summer of 1971, Askew gave eight speeches for tkie tax. Transcript of Interview on WCTV (Tallahassee) program
"Perspectives," 30 May 19'71, S66, Box 1, Askew Papers; Hmida Times Union, 22
October 19'71; Speaking Engagement Master Schedule, Askew Papers; Askew
Press Release, 26 October 1971, both in Askew Papers, S686, Box 1; For information on donations to Citizens for Tax reform see Askew Papers S686 Box
2, Folder: "Corporate Income Tax-MTST letters" which contains reports and
summaries for contributions of the organization.
24 October 1971;
45. Ft. Lauderdale iVms, 21 September 1971; Ron'da Times-Union,
St. Petersburg Times, 23 September 1971.
44.
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Surprisingly, one of Askew's own cabinet members spoke out
against the issue. Since the cabinet was an elective body, not
appointed by the governor, Askew often found himself at odds
with certain members. One of those was Education Commissioner
Floyd Christian. Another was State Comptroller Fred Dickinson,
who announced his agreement with tax opponents that "all taxes
ultimately go to the consumer." Dickinson was not incorrect on
his assertion. A memo written by Arthur England, special tax
counsel to the House of Representatives concluded that one possible outcome of the corporate profits tax would be a slight increase
in consumer prices, but such an increase would be limited by corporations spreading their price increases nationwide. Thus the
corporate profits tax might raise consumer prices slightly but not
as high as another sales tax or property tax.46
Letters to state newspapers did not share such ambivalence. In
fact, they were quite hostile, reflecting the general anti-tax mood
of the decade. Writing to the Tampa Tm'bune, H. H. Stout called
Askew a "traveling salesman" whose "overindulgence in this matter
may have killed the goose that might have laid Reubin's proverbial
golden egg." John V. Fasson, in a scathing letter to the Florida
Times-Union, attacked Lt. Governor Tom Adams, who had
remarked, "We don't want any taxdodging johnnies in Florida."
Fasson decried giving politicians a "blank check" and condemned
Adams. Had thousands of businesses not come to Florida to
escape profits taxes, the "hundreds of thousands of his kind of taxeating parasites would be living off gophers and cabbage palm
buds today," Fasson asserted. B. J. Burnett of Tallahassee lamented that there seemed to be no limit to the appetite of "tax eaters.
Their craw never can be filled." A1 Whiteside of Largo accused
Askew of running a confidence scam with Florida voters. Askew
had campaigned as the "Champion of God, motherhood, and tax
reform," wrote Whiteside. His particular con, he claimed, was convincing voters that he wanted to tax the rich and give to the poor.
In reality, he concluded, Askew was merely paving the way to enacting a personal income tax.*'

46. FZorida Times-Union, 29 October 1971; Arthur England memo "Corporate
Income Tax: Pre-referendum Information Memorandum," 1 September
1971, Askew Papers, S686, Box 1.
47. Tampa Tribune, 1 November 1971; FZon'da Times-Union, 31 October 1971; St.
Petersburg Times, 1 November 1971.

Published by STARS, 2007

29

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 86 [2007], No. 3, Art. 4

Askew wrestled with the perception that he was a tax-hungry
fiend. He did not favor a personal income tax, and doubted that
anyone could enact a constitutional amendment establishing
one. He also bristled at what became the standard first question
in every print or television interview he conducted: "is this a personal income tax?'' On the one hand, it allowed Askew to state
unequivocally, "absolutely not." On the other hand, the fact
that journalists continued to ask the question might place the
idea in voters' minds that Askew was up to something.
To
counter such claims, Askew stepped up his criticism of Florida's
special interests and raised the stakes of the election as a vote for
something bigger than a tax: "It will reveal more clearly than
ever before, whether we are willing to master our own future,
willing to face up to our own problems and willing to do what is
necessary to keep our state a decent, clean, and progressive
place in which to live." He specifically targeted Gulf Power and
Winn Dixie Grocery stores. Both corporations provided easy targets for Askew's counter-attacks. The state, he said, had for too
long let itself be subject to the Gulf Powers and the Winn-Dixies
of the world. Too many businesses, he declared, "are used to
having a back door into the governor's mansion." The "back
door" was one aspect of a larger problem, the state's reliance on
lobbyists for research on issues. Florida, like a lot of other poor
southern states hampered by frugality in state spending,
depended on lobbyists to perform perfunctory staffing functions, such as issue research. Not surprisingly, in many cases,
reports reflected favorably on positions and issues that industry
lobbyists advocated. By 1970, staffing levels for the legislature
had increased dramatically, with a subsequent expansion of state
payrolls, a frequent target of tax reform opponents in the present election. Askew credited such staff increase as one reason
that "for the first time we really started to see what a poor tax
structure we have."48
Askew exposed the hypocrisy of the anti-tax groups. He
pointed to Winn Dixie's commission on sales taxes. He turned
his attention to state senator William Dean "Wig" Barrow, a
vocal corporate tax opponent, who led the fight to enact a 1970

48. Ft. Lauderdule News, 3 November 1971; St. Petersburg Times, 17, 28 October

1971.
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law to require a fishing permit for a simple pole and line. "I
would like the voters to judge him on his innate sense of fairness," said Askew. "He voted to tax the poor guy trying to catch
fish to eat." Askew also attacked what he thought was a fatal
flaw in the opposition argument that corporate income taxes
would be passed on to consumers. If, as they claimed, the tax
would merely be passed on to consumers, then why fight it,
Askew asked: "If they thought for one minute they weren't
going to have to pay anything, and pass it along to the consumers, they wouldn't be spending a quarter of a million dollars
to defeat it."49 When a reporter asked if he shopped at Winn
Dixie, Askew responded, "No sir. And neither does anyone in
my family. We used to."50
In the last few days before the November 2 vote, Jack
Eckerd, a late addition to the opposition, stepped up his
attacks. Eckerd had run for governor and lost to Claude Kirk in
the 1970 Republican gubernatorial primary (he would run
unsuccessfully in 1978 against Bob Graham). Stumping in
Hollywood, Florida, Askew criticized what one of his supporters
had called the "untaxed fat cats" and their "stooges." Askew
asserted that Ed Ball was hiding in the shadows," and that J.E.
Davis might later regret his actions. "There'll be another day,
friends." Regarding Eckerd, Askew granted that the drug store
giant had a right to campaign against the tax, but he reminded
his audience that "All I know is that I won [the gubernatorial
election] and he lost." Such rhetoric infuriated his opponents
and disquieted political commentators such as Everette Willard,
who concluded that Askew was "uptight over the issue," and
accused Askew of being consumed with the tax vote to the detriment of other pressing issues in state government: "If someone
asked you what he had done in his first ten months in office,
what would be your answer?" He also criticized Askew for
falling into the political gutter with his personal attacks of
opposition leaders in the last few days leading up to the election. "Askew's conduct during the past week," wrote Willard,
"with his personal attacks on opponents, has been that of a

49. Ibid.
50. St. Petersburg Times, 28 October 1971.
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loser." Van Priest, president of Citizens Against said "I personally think he is running scared."51
On the Sunday before the election, Askew made his final
push for support. Speaking before 400 senior citizens in Miami
Beach, one of four rallies in Dade county, Askew simplified the
issue into a single question: "The question really is going to be
who runs Florida-whether it is going to be the special interests
or you." As he spoke on Miami Beach, a small plane circled
overhead trailing a banner that read, "Vote n o on the income
tax Tuesday." Askew did not let the opportunity to pass: "that
plane is part of the planned confusion. We've come so far. How
sad indeed it would be to let a few confuse you at the last minute,
to force you to vote against yourself."52 The Miami Herald
agreed, criticizing Askew's opponents for their secrecy and for
their attempts to "sell a big lie" about the tax reform package.
Just before the election, Winn Dixie sent the governor two crates
of melons as a peace offering, which Askew promptly donated to
an interfaith child care center his church, First Presbyterian in
Tallaha~see.~~
The results of the election surprised those on both sides as
'70.3 percent (834,272 to 350,244) of voters approved the constitutional amendment instituting a corporate profits tax. In heavy
turnout, just over 1.1 million people voted, almost 36 percent of
the state's 3,015,931 registered voters. In most counties the
amendment was the only item on the ballot. The amendment
won every county except eight: Jefferson, St. John's, Lafayette,
Lake, Madison, Nassau, Osceola, and Orange. Even Duval
County, home to Jacksonville and Winn Dixie, supported the tax
by 60 percent. Since the tax amendment was virtually the only
issue Askew in his campaign for governor, the results of the election confirmed his power and influence in his first year as governor. It also verified the mandate for tax reform, as Askew had
claimed and his opponents denied. It appeared that Askew had
won by larger majorities in select counties than he did when he
ran for governor in 19'70. In Orange County, Askew lost to Kirk

51. Florida Times-Union, 29 October, 2 November 1971; Transcript of Interview on
WCTV (Tallahassee) program "Perspectives," 30 May 1971, S66, Box 1, Askew
Papers.
52. St. Petenburg Times, 1 November 1971; Hm'da Times-Union, 1 November 1971.
53. Miami Herald, 2 November 1971.
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by 25,000 votes, but lost on the tax proposal by only 4,000. In
Sarasota, Palm Beach, Broward, and Pinellas counties, Askew
exceeded his 1970 vote. He narrowly won the latter three in 1970
but in the tax vote, he carried Palm Beach with 68 percent and
Pinellas with 79 percent. In Sarasota, Claude Kirk had beaten
Askew with 57 percent but that county supported the tax with 75
percent of the vote. Key Biscayne, President Nixon's vacation
home and friendly territory for Republicans, voted against Askew
in 1970, but supported the tax by 69 percent.54 Askew spent considerable time in Dade County, which held one-sixth of the state's
population, and the results showed. Not a single precinct-of
340-in Dade County voted against the tax and the county supported the amendment by a margin of 5 to 1 (82 percent). In
contrast, Askew had garnered only 66 percent of the vote in Dade
in his gubernatorial election the year before.55
The Miami Herald concluded that the overwhelming support
for his corporate profits tax amendment to the state constitution
made Askew the strongest chief executive in state history. To run
for governor on tax reform, to propose it in the first year of an
administration, to usher it through a hostile legislature, and to
convince 7 of 10 voters to support it were achievements of such
magnitude that Askew indeed enjoyed a mandate from the voters
in 1970 and again in 19'71. Askew's broad appeal and the seriousness of the issue drove voters to the polls. "Never before has a governor put his prestige on the line so dramatically and scored such
a decisive triumph," wrote the Herald's editors. The St. Petersburg
Times gushed with praise for the governor, crediting his "freshness, sincerity, and integrity," and anticipated a ripple effect in
the state's power structure; "heaven help the legislators, in those
counties that voted for the tax, who campaigned against it.'' A
new age in Florida politics had begun, wrote the Times editors:
"This referendum served the final notice of a new direction in
Florida politics. The day is gone when a few economic barons
could dictate to state government. Reapportionment freed the
state legislature of its susceptibility to manipulations by that
group. Reubin Askew this week freed the governor's mansion."56

54. Miami Herald, 3 November 1971; Florida Times-Union, 3 November 1971.
55. Miami Herald, 3 November 1971.
56. St. Petersburg T i m s , 3 November 1971.
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House Republican minority leader Don Reed was a vocal and visible opponent of the tax, but 68% of the voters in his home county of Palm Beach supported it. Likewise, Cocoa supported the tax
with 70% of the vote against the appeals of its state senator, Beth
Johnson. Turnout was much higher than expected. In Duval
County voter registrars predicted only 60,000 would vote, yet
79,000 cast a ballot.57
Askew declared the election a "victory for good government,
a victory for Florida, and a victory for Democracy as well." The St.
Petersburg Times called "Askew's miracle" the "final notice of a new
direction in Florida politics," and an expression of trust by the voters. "When he speaks," the editors opined, "Floridians listen
because they believe he is honest, forthright and devoted to the
public interest." His opponents were at once impressed and
shocked. Winn Dixie chairman James E. Davis candidly admitted
defeat: ""We got beat. It was a good knock-down fight all right.
And it indicated a trend in Florida politics, I believe. I wish him
luck. The people have spoken." Ed Ball was equally amazed: "It
looks like the governor has had his way." When told that the
amendment carried by more than seventy percent statewide, Ball
responded, "Well!"
State Representative Dave Smith a
Republican from Pompano Beach, reacted with disgust: "Reubin
and his socialist, Marxist friends won. As Roosevelt said, 'This day
shall live in infamy."' The remaining Republicans in Broward
County conceded the mandate for the tax and pledged to support
the will of the people.58
The success of the corporate profits tax not only exhibited
Askew's tremendous political power and appeal, but it also add to
Ralph Turlington's legacy. Turlington was one of the first to call
for such a tax, in the 1960s, holding hearings and writing a failed
bill to implement the tax. The St. Petersburg Times opined that "If
Askew was the messiah of tax reform, Representative Ralph
Turlington of Gainesville was John the Baptist." Turlington allied

57. Miami Herald, 3 November 1971; St. Petersburg Times, 3 November 1971; Ft.
Lauderdale News, 3 November 1971; Rurida Times-Union,3 November 1971.
58. Askew press conference transcript, 2 November 1971,Askew Papers, S66, Box
1; St. Petersburg Times, 4 November 1971; Flmida Times-Union, 3 November
1971; Broward County Sentinel, 3 November 1971; Fort Laudmdale News, 3
November 1971.
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with Askew to play a primary role in the passing the amendment
through the House of Representatives in 1971.59
On January 1, 1972, the corporate profits tax went in to effect
with state officials expecting to record revenue of almost $1 10 million, with $120 million projected for the second year.60
Months after the successful campaign to enact the corporate
profits tax, Askew received letters from close supporters in business
reporting incidents of retaliation by tax foes. Thomas Fleming,
Chairman of First Bank and Trust Company of Boca Raton, reported that a major account in his bank, Winn Dixie store number 263,
had withdrawn its business and assets from the bank. The action
arose from an order from the store's corporate offices in
Jacksonville. Fleming had been an outspoken supporter of the tax.
'You know," wrote Fleming, "this retaliation can have two sides-I
can have a meeting with my over 200 employees and make then
aware of Winn Dixie's attitude of revenge when you cross them on
their political goals."61
Although the 19'71 tax vote was hailed as a victory for progressive state leadership and considered evidence of Askew's
political power and ability, business interests found creative ways
to evade the tax. By 2003, only a small percentage of large corporations doing business in Florida paid any of the corporate
profits tax, thanks to the rise of "S" corporations, called "flowthru entities" because their income flows through to the owners.
In the 1950s Congress gave small corporations help to grow by
allowing those companies with up to 10 stockholders the opportunity to escape federal tax liabilities altogether by passing all
income through the shareholders, who then filed it on their personal returns. In the 1980s, Congress loosened rules to allow
flow thrus for companies with as many as seventy-five shareholders. When businesses restructured to become "S" corporations,
Florida with no personal income tax decided to mirror the federal tax laws, allowing companies and their owners to escape paying the tax altogether and making the state a "Subchapter S
heaven." In the 1990s, Florida's legislature and governor fol-

59. St. Petersburg Times, 3 November 1971.
60. TallahasseeDemocrat, 2 January 1972.
61. Thomas Fleming to Jim Smith, 11 February 1972; R.E. Wallace (Assistant
Secretary to Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., Miami Division) to Thomas Fleming, 9
February 1972, both in Askew Papers, S686, Box1 .
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lowed the federal trend of permitting more big businesses to
avoid state income taxes, even going so far as to exempt all
Limited Liability Corporations, LLCs, from paying the corporate
profits tax. Companies such as Wal-Mart and Daytona
International Speedway pay no such taxes. Ralph Turlington
concluded that at the time the corporate profits tax was enacted
in 1971, S Corporations were not numerous because of the ten
shareholder limit: "These outfits have been used much more
broadly than we imagined. If it had been today instead of then,
we might well have taken a different stance." The legislature had
been warned about such corporations. In 1971, in the days leading up to the referendum to establish the corporate profits tax,
Arthur England had suggested that S Corporations "should probably be dealt with under the state income tax statute in the same
manner as all other corporate entities, to wit, be taxed on undistributed profits." In 2003, The St. Petersburg Times lamented that
only 5,303 of the state's 1.5 million businesses paid 98 percent of
the tax: "Three decades after former Gov. Reubin Askew persuaded voters that corporations ought to pay their fair share for
the work of government, the percentage of taxes the state collects
has never been lower. Lawmakers have so eagerly created
exemptions credits, deductions, and loopholes that nine of every
ten businesses now pay nothing at all. Nothing. The cruise giant
Carnival Corp., with $1 billion in profits last year, paid nothing.
The phone giant Verizon Communications Inc., with $6 billion
in pretax profits, paid nothing." Reubin Askew's vision of an
equitable tax distribution among citizens and corporation in
Florida was nothing more than a dream unfulfilled. The imbalance worsened in the years after 1998 as corporate tax revenue
dropped by 39.6 percent while sales taxes increased by 20.5 percent. In that year the legislature exempted companies that had
listed themselves as "limited liability companies." In 2003, at
least eleven of Florida's thirty largest companies paid no corporate income taxes, including Rooms to Go, a furniture dea1er;JM
Family Enterprises, an automotive group; and George E. Warren
Corporation, a petroleum distributor. Together, the three companies made more than $1 1 billion in sales in 2002, yet they paid
no corporate income taxes. Indeed, JM Family Enterprises
bragged that it had paid no corporate income taxes in six years.
Very few companies chose to pay the tax out of civic duty.
Preston Haskell, owner of the state's second largest construction
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firm, does. Haskell did not rush out to change the type of company he owns to evade the tax, and saw it as his duty as s citizen
of Florida to pay it. As the St. Petersburg Times reported in 2003,
for every Haskell who paid corporate taxes, 281 businesses evaded the tax. The campaign to enact the only successful tax reform
in Florida since the sales tax was enacted in 1949, gave way over
time to dilution at the hands of more conservative legislators and
governors who did not share Askew's vision for tax justice. The
tax revolt that swept the nation in the mid-1970s came to Florida
much later, and was not led by citizen reformers, but by a lessthan-visionary state government increasingly influenced by lobbyists and business interests.62

62. Ironically, Florida's lack of a personal income tax has indirectly resulted in
higher property tax rates as the legislature looks for new streams of revenue
to meet the need of growing state population. In 2006, reassessment at much
higher rates almost incited citizen tax revolt, as they saw corporations paying
fewer taxes. In the summer of 2007 a new legislature and new Governor
called a special session to address the crisis. It is expected that whatever the
legislature does, the voters will have to approve it in the form of a referendum
for voters in the 2008 presidential primary, Time, July 21, 2007; St. Petmsburg
Times, 20 January 2002; 30 October, 23 November, 2003,28 December 2003,
4 January 2004; Arthur England memo "Corporate Income Tax: Pre-referendum Information Memorandum," 1 September 1971, Askew Papers, S686,
Box 1.
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